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ABSTRACT

The unprecedented demand for performance in the latest technologies will ultimately require
changes in the way we design cache. Emerging high density embedded memories such as SpinTransfer Torque Random Access Memory (STTRAM) have emerged as a possible candidate for
universal memory due to its high speed, low power, non-volatility, and low cost. Although attractive,
STTRAM is susceptible to contactless tampering through malicious exposure to magnetic field with
the intention to steal or modify the bitcell content. In this thesis, we explore various attack techniques
on STTRAM and then propose a novel array-based sensor to detect the polarity and magnitude of
such attacks and then propose two design techniques to mitigate the attack. With our research, we
have been able to successfully implement and accurately detect an attack while providing sufficient
compensation window (few ns to ~100 us) to enable proactive protection measures. Finally, we show
that variable-strength ECC can adapt correction capability to tolerate failures with various strength
of an attack.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION1
The market for nonvolatile memory has grown tremendously over the past few years.
Among the nonvolatile memory types, flash memory has been in high demand as the market for
portable device greater than before. However, flash memory technology has begun reaching its
limitation as technology sizes decrease and researchers have begun exploring other options. Some
limitations include short data retention time, limited numbers of read and write cycle, and
reliability issue respected to low size scaling. As of result, recent researchers have been focusing
on the possible new architectures and materials for low power, high density, and non-volatile
characteristic so called the “Universal Memory” [7-8].
Emerging memory technologies such as Spin-Transfer Torque RAM (STT-RAM) [1],
Domain Wall Memory (DWM), Resistive RAM (ReRAM), and Memrister [4] have been on high
interest among researchers. Out of these listed technologies, STTRAM has been widely considered
to be a suitable candidate for the possible Universal Memory. STT-RAM is an energy efficient
modification of Magnetic RAM (MRAM), where the switching of the magnetization is through
current induced spin-transfer torque [1]. STT-RAM offers fast and low power switching via use
of spin-polarized current, potential density that can be close to DRAM levels, high endurance and
excellent retention time.

1
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1.1 Spin-Transfer Torque Random Access Memory
Spin-Transfer Torque RAM (STTRAM) is a promising memory technology due to high
speed, low power, non-volatility, and low cost. The commercialization of Magnetic RAM
(MRAM) has fueled the development of STTRAM further as the potential future memory
technology. STTRAM is an energy-efficient modification of MRAM [2], where the switching of
the magnetization is accomplished through current induced spin-transfer torque. STTRAM offers
fast and low-power switching via use of spin-polarized current. Due to density closer to DRAM,
speed closer to SRAM, high endurance and superb retention time, STTRAM is widely considered
to be a suitable candidate for Universal Memory [7-8]. Figure 1.1 shows the STTRAM cell
schematic, where the Magnetic Tunnel Junction (MTJ) is used as the storage element. The MTJ
contains a free layer and a pinned magnetic layer. The resistance of the MTJ stack is high (low) if
free layer magnetic orientation is anti-parallel (parallel) compared to the fixed layer. The
configuration of the MTJ can be changed from parallel to anti-parallel (or vice versa) by injecting
current from source-line to bitline (or vice versa). The spin-torque transfer phenomena for reversal
of magnetization in free layer reduce the write power compared to conventional MRAM.

Figure 1.1 Schematic of STTRAM bitcell showing MTJ
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1.2 STTRAM Vulnerabilities
Although STTRAM is a promising memory technology, it brings in an important security
concern. It is susceptible to contactless tampering efforts, e.g. by subjecting it to strong external
magnetic field, an adversary can corrupt stored contents. The fixed layer of STTRAM is robust.
However, the free layer could be toggled through both spin polarized current as well as magnetic
field.
The free layer is susceptible to both the magnitude and polarity of external magnetic field
it is subjected to. The motivation of tampering for an adversary is to corrupt the data or steal
information. This could prevent STTRAMs application to a wide range of mobile devices. Figure
1.2 and 1.3 shows that the MTJ free layer could flip its polarity either using current or with 250Oe
magnetic field. The magnetic field produced by a common horseshoe magnet is ~350 Oe [3] which
is sufficient to flip the weak bits in presence of process variations and thermal noise. Note that
although we take STTRAM as motivational case study, other forms of magnetic memories such
as MRAM, Domain Wall Memory (DWM) and Ferroelectric RAM (FRAM) [4] is also expected
to experience similar issues, and hence vulnerable to tampering attacks. The ease of tampering the
data using low-cost commercially available magnets underscores the need of quantifying the
impact of magnetic attack and exploring effective, low-overhead protection mechanisms [5].
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Figure 1.2 Flipping of MTJ free layer due to STT (Happ=0Oe, I=0.638mA)
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Figure 1.3 Flipping due to external magnetic field (Happ=260Oe, I=0).
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This thesis provides an in-depth analysis of the vulnerability issues related to STTRAM
and propose an on-chip sensor based on replica of a memory in order to accurately detect the
magnitude and polarity of an attack. In summary, we make following contributions in this thesis,
•

We investigate the impact of magnetic attack on an STTRAM array. We consider both Direct
Current (DC) and Alternating Current (AC) attack modes.

•

We propose an array-based sensor to detect the magnitude and polarity of an attack. The sensor
array is deliberately designed to be more sensitive to attack (than the memory core) by reducing
the free-layer volume and weak write.

•

We monitor the bit error rate (BER) of sensor array and take proactive steps to mitigate the
attack. Our investigation reveals that retention mode is robust to attack. Therefore, we propose
array retention during attack.

•

Finally, we present a dynamic error-rate dependent variable-strength ECC to mitigate the bit
failures due to attacks.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we present the magnetic

properties and the background on MTJ. In Chapter 3, we present the magnetic attack model and
introduce the magnetic field sensor design. The on-chip compensation and correction methodology
are proposed in Chapter 4. Overall simulation results are presented in Chapter 5. Finally, the
conclusions are drawn in Chapter 6.

5

CHAPTER 2: MAGNETIC ATTACK ON STTRAM2
In this chapter, we present the attack model, quantify the impact on memory stability, and
describe the impact of process variation. Additionally, we describe the design of a novel tamper
detection sensor for magnetic memory based on a memory replica (similar to critical path replicas
that monitor path delay variables in a chip).
2.1 Background on MTJ
The magnetization orientation of the pinned layer is fixed using an aniti-ferromagnetic
coupling and it cannot be changed using nominal current or external magnetic field. Contrary to
this, the free layer could be toggled by passing current or by applying magnetic field. The
magnetization dynamics of the MTJ free layer is governed by LLG equation [6].
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where m is unit vectors representing local magnetic moment, Is is spin current, G(ψ) is the
transmission co-efficient, ℏ is reduced planck’s constant, α is Gilbert damping parameter and e+
is the unit vector along fixed layer magnetization. The effective field is represented by H
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H. + H/ + H + H 0 , where Ha is applied field, Hk is anisotropy field, Hd is demagnetization field
and Hex is exchange field.
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In STTRAM the writing of MTJ is done using STT term (for low power consumption) and
external field Ha is kept 0. However, Ha can also be used to toggle the magnetization in absence
of charge current (field term, eq (1)). Note that magnetic field-based toggling is the foundation of
MRAM. The attacker can exploit this extra knob to corrupt the free layer data. Both permanent
magnet as well as electromagnet could be used for tampering by the adversary.
2.2 Attack Model
The attacks on STTRAM could be launched either through static (DC) magnetic field or
alternating (AC) magnetic field. The DC attack is less detrimental as it can only create unipolar
failures. For example, a magnetic field will cause failures only for the bits whose free layer
orientation is opposite to the applied field. However, the AC field could cause more damage as it
will affect both storage polarities. Due to ease of AC field generation using a low-cost
electromagnet this type of attack is highly likely.
The attack could be launched either during ideal (retention) mode or functional mode
(read/write). Note that read current is unipolar irrespective to the storage polarity whereas write
current polarity is data dependent. The impact of attack during functional mode (especially read)
could be more detrimental than retention due to two factors: (a) presence of disturb current; and,
(b) higher frequency of reads compared to writes. Both storage polarity will be affected under AC
attack. During write operation, the AC field will either assist if the current polarity matches with
the magnetic field or suppress the attack if the current polarity is opposite to applied field. In all
of the above scenarios the attack could either manifest as hard failure (i.e., flipping of bitcell
content) or soft failure (i.e., delay in write or degraded sense margin). The soft failures could be
mitigated by slowing down the read/write operation but the hard failures need to be avoided or
corrected through error correction.
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The frequency of the magnetic field is important in the context of failures in functional
mode. If the AC field frequency is faster than the write time then it can affect writing both data
polarities. Similarly it can also affect both storage polarities during read operation. If the frequency
of AC field is slow then the impact will be less harmful.
2.3 Attack Analysis
We use publicly available micro-magnetic simulator OOMMF [9] to analyze the impact of
DC and AC magnetic field tampering on the integrity of STTRAM. The MTJ parameters used for
sim is shown in Table 1. It can be noted from Figure 2.1 that the MTJ polarity could be flipped in
retention mode. The flip time reduces with increasing strength of magnetic field. The impact of
AC field is plotted in Figure 2.2. For this simulation we have used a sinusoidal field and varied the
frequency from 150MHz to 2GHz. It can be observed that higher frequency AC field can cause
more damage even with smaller amplitude than lower frequency AC field and higher amplitude.

Table 1. MTJ Parameters
Parameter

Value

Dimension

60nmx120nmx3nm

damping const (α)

0.01

Sat. Mag. (Ms)

1000 A/m

Exchange Constant (A)

2e-11 J/m.

Polarization

0.8

Spin conductance

1e-3

Activation energy (Ea)

56kT

Anisotropy const (Ku)

Ea/volume
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Figure 2.1 Impact of magnetic field on the stability of free-layer: The flipping time reduces
with DC magnetic field

Figure 2.2 Impact of magnetic field on the stability of free-layer: The flipping time reduces
with AC magnetic field
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The comparison of MTJ stability between retention and functional mode is considered in
Figure 2.3-4. For the analysis we have assumed different magnitudes of read/write currents and
polarities for both DC and AC fields. For DC field, it can be observed that the bits can fail easily
when the current polarity and magnetic field are in the same direction (assistive). The flip time is
higher when current and magnetic field are in opposite direction (suppressive). Similar observation
also holds true for AC field.
The stability of MTJ free layer is a function of its volume. Therefore it is possible to
enhance the robustness of the MTJ against tampering by increasing the size. For this simulation
we have swept the MTJ thickness from 3nm to 0.5nm. Figure 2.5 plots the flip time with respect
to the volume of free layer for DC attack. It can be observed that the bitcell is able to withstand
weak magnetic attack with higher volume. However, it fails to provide protection against strong
attack (>400Oe). The simulation results for AC attack (Figure 2.6) indicate that higher volume can
protect against attack of lower frequency. High frequency attack can cause failure regardless of
MTJ volume.

Figure 2.3 Impact of functional operation on the flip time in presence of assistive current
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Figure 2.4 Impact of functional operation on the flip time in presence of suppressing current

Figure 2.5 Impact of MTJ volume on the flip time in presence of DC magnetic field
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Figure 2.6 Impact of MTJ volume on the flip time in presence of AC magnetic field

2.4 Impact of Process Variation
For the large caches, process variation in MTJ and access transistor can modulate the
failure characteristics in presence of tampering. Process variation is also crucial for sensor design
and detection of strength of attack. In this work we have considered the variations in access
transistor and MTJ volume. The access transistor variation is lumped in threshold voltage
variation. The (mean, sigma) of VTH variation is assumed to be (0, 50mV). The volume variation
(mean, sigma) is assumed to be (0, 5%). The LLG model [10-11] is ported to verilogA (after
calibration with OOMMF) and used for fast circuit simulation. The impact of variations on failures
during retention as well as functional mode are evaluated. A total of 5000 Monte Carlo points are
simulated for analysis.
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Figure 2.7-8 shows the mean and sigma of flip time for different strength of DC magnetic
field. For functional mode we have considered 50uA, 250uA and 500uA initial assistive current
using a voltage source. It can be noted that mean flip time reduces in functional mode due to more
disturbance. Interestingly the sigma increases because the process variations in MTJ and access
transistor modulates the current which in turn affects the flip time. This plot also indicates that the
bitcells are more robust to attack in retention mode regardless of variability. This feature can be
exploited for mitigating the impact of attack (Chapter 3). The functional mode (read/write)
amplifies the impact of variability and results in random bit errors.

Figure 2.7 Impact of process variations on flip time during retention and function mode (mean)

Figure 2.8 Impact of process variations on flip time during retention and function mode (sigma)
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2.5 Tamper Detection Sensor
2.5.1 Sensor Design
The key objective of the proposed sensor is to sense or detect magnetic field attack
‘proactively’ in order to trigger corrective steps for the functional STTRAM array. Therefore, the
sensor can avoid wrong operation of memory under magnetic field attacks through compensation
and appropriate error correction that tailors the error correction capability to the intensity of the
external magnetic field. The sensor should be able to sense an attack ahead of time, i.e. before the
memory corruption. It can also sense: (a) the intensity of the attack; and (b) the polarity of the
attack, both of which can be useful in auto-protecting a memory subsystem against data corruption.
We use a small replica of the STTRAM array as a sensor. Although functionally equivalent
to the actual array, the sensor is designed to meet the objectives described above. The sensor is
embedded in the array (in the peripheral areas) to capture the spatial variation in magnetic attack
(Figure 2.9). The sensor array is designed by modifying the actual STTRAM array. The intensity
of the attack is sensed through the error rate of the sensor array. High error rate corresponds to
higher intensity.

SA3

SA2

rden

SL

BL

Write driver

WL

Midlogic

SA1

SA0

Sensor array

wren
WL bias

Control logic for sensor array (address
/read/write/biasing)

Senseamp

rden

Wordline (WL) driver

Figure 2.9 Embedded attack sensor in memory array. The details of sensor array with peripheral
circuits is shown in inset. Control logic is shared among the subarrays and contains the logic to
generate address, read, write and data and analyze the response.
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The proposed sensors have following salient features to quantify the intensity and polarity of
attack:
(a) Multiple copies with different free layer volumes: Multiple copies of sensor each with
different MTJ free layer volumes e.g., small and medium will be employed. The objective of
changing the MTJ sizes is to sense the attack even in presence of process variation.
(b) Distribution of sensors: These different flavors of sensors can be distributed in the
cache to collect the spatial responses.
(c) Weak writing/stress: This technique lowers the activation energy of MTJ so that it fails
early. The weak writing could be accommodated by using Design-for-Test (DFT) circuit to keep
the write drivers active and bias the wordline voltages appropriately to tune the bitcell current
(Figure 2.9). The column multiplexers are kept ON to enable weak writing of all columns.
(d) Array architecture: The sensor array is always kept ON (during functional and retention
mode) to sense the attack. The total number of global columns is kept 1 to lower area, power
overhead (especially for weak write sensors) and faster test time. The column area contains sense
amplifier and write driver and row area contains minimal sizes wordline driver that is modified to
provide biased voltages to access transistors.
(e) Data polarity: Different data polarities could be stored in the sensor array to detect the
direction of attack. One example is to store block 1’s (0’s) in the sensor to detect DC attack in
negative (positive) direction. Block 1 and 0 pattern will capture unidirectional fails. Checkerboard
pattern could be stored to detect AC attack (to capture bidirectional fails).
(f) Test speed and compensation window: The test is executed in parallel with stressing of
neighboring sensor arrays (for weak write sensors). For test, first the stressing of the array and
weak assertion of wordline is paused. Next, read followed by write is performed to re-initialize the
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bits. The error rate determines the magnitude of attack. The test speed determines the amount of
time left for launching the compensation. For example, if the bits fail 100ns before the real bits
and test takes 25ns then the time available to enable mitigation techniques (which is compensation
window) is 75ns.
(g) Control logic: The control logic resides in midlogic area and generates address,
read/write signals and data and, collects responses to determine error rate from various sensor
flavors (Figure 2.9).
(h) Power saving: Note that weak writing of bits may cause significant power overhead.
To harness the benefit of early attack detection while lowering the power consumption, the sensors
with weak write (sensor-w) could be (a) interleaved with normal sensors (sensor-n); and, (b) turned
on periodically.
2.5.2 Simulation Results
Figures 2.10 and 2.11 show the sensitivity of free layer volume with respect to the flip time
of DC attack. It can be noted that flip time is very sensitive to free layer volume for lower magnetic
field attack. A 33% lower volume reduces the flip time by 2X (for 220Oe). For lower fields
(<200Oe) the sensitivity is exponential. We compute the flip time difference between functional
MTJs and sensor MTJs and plot them in Figure 2.11. For lower fields we extrapolate the flip time
difference. The sensor MTJ uses 33% lower volume (sensor-n). The results indicate that a 50Oe
attack could be detected ~100ns before the real bits is corrupted. For weak attacks (<10Oe) the
sensor can detect it ~1us in advance. By adding 50uA of current (for sensor-w) the sensitivity
could be improved by ~80X at the cost of extra power overhead. An additional 50uA can improve
the sensitivity by an additional 2X.
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From above discussion it is evident that volume modulation and weak writing can be
effectively employed to create two flavors of sensor arrays. Additional sensor flavors can be
created by lowering MTJ volume further and/or combining weak write. Assuming 4 local columns
and 128 rows per sensor array, the weak writing could cause 25mW power (at 1V) for sensor-w.
Therefore, sensor-w should be judiciously used (by limiting their number and frequency of usage).
The area overhead of the proposed sensors are less than 1% since they are embedded in the
transition region of the arrays.

Figure 2.10 Sensitivity free layer volume on flip time. 33% reduction in volume reduces flip
time by 2X.

Figure 2.11 Effectiveness of volume scaling and weak write on early detection of attack.
Reduction of 33% volume can detect 50Oe attack ~100ns before actual array fails. Weak write
of 50uA can provide 80X more time. An additional 50uA can provide 2X extra time.
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CHAPTER 3: ON-CHIP COMPENSATION3
The sensor proposed in the previous section is used to sense polarity and intensity of attack
and trigger two types of compensation mechanisms namely, array sleep and variable strength ECC.
3.1 Computation Methodology
Figure 3.1 shows the top level schematic of the proposed sensing and compensation
methodology. The attack could be DC as well as AC and the magnitude could vary temporally and
spatially. To capture the spatial variation we distribute the sensors along the array. The temporal
variation is captured using sensitive sensor-w and regular sensor-n. The error rate and failing
polarities collected from sensors are provided to a control unit that triggers compensation
techniques. Due to proactive sensing, the control unit can trigger precautionary measures to
improve the array resilience against the tampering.
Sensor data
STTRAM array

Sensor
arrays

Control

STTRAM array

ECC
decoder

ECC
encoder

mode_selection

Variable-strength ECC

Figure 3.1 Overall system protection approach that includes an STTRAM array with embedded
sensors, attack mitigation, and variable-strength ECC.
3
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3.2 Array Sleep
From Section IID it is evident that the STTRAM bits are more robust to attack in retention
mode than functional mode of operation. Therefore, the array can be put in retention mode till the
attack subsides. Although simple, this technique may result in performance loss due to stall and
may still experience attack induced corruption of bits. For further resilience, this technique can be
combined with adaptive strength ECC to ensure strong encoding before the enabling sleep and
correction after wake-up (Chapter 4). Note that reading, encoding and writing the bits is associated
with significant power overhead. Therefore this technique should be combined with appropriate
application where only the “important” segment of cache could be protected to ensure quality-ofservice requirement.

3.3 Variable-Strength ECC
In addition to on-chip electromagnet, variable-strength ECC is used to correct failures in
STTRAM. The proposed ECC can provide variable error correction capability to STTRAM array
based on the strength of magnetic field attack. The variable-strength ECC can dynamically change
error correction capability to provide the right amount of error protection to individual memory
blocks against failures. In order to enhance the multi-bit tolerance scheme, we used BoseChaudhuri-Hocquenghem (BCH) cyclic code with 128 bit data-length. The variable-strength ECC
offers four different error correction capabilities (1bit/ 2bit/ 4bit/ 8bit), and the correction
capability can be automatically adapted based on the intensity/polarity of the magnetic attack
measured in the tamper detection sensor. When there is no magnetic attack, ECC can be completely
turned off or it can be working with simplest ECC (1 bit correction). As the magnitude of attack is
becoming intense, which can be measured at detection sensor, the control unit in Figure 3.2(a) can
adapt ECC to provide stronger error corrections (2bit/ 4bit/ 8bit corrections). When smaller error
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correction options are selected, the unused modules in the ECC can be easily turned off to save
computation energy.

Key
Equation
Solver

Syndrome
Generator

Chien
Search

R(x)

C(x)

FIFO
(a)

S3

4bit

2bit

S2

1bit

S1

8bit

S4

S14
S15

(b)

S16

S1
VDD

TG
TG
TG

S14

TG

PDN

S4

S15

TG

Output

S16

8bit

Input

S3

4bit

PUN

mode_selection
Temper
Detection
Sensor

S2

Φ

Control

2bit

Encoder

Decoding

1bit

Encoding

Φ
GND

Turning-off gate(TG)

(c)

Figure 3.2 Variable-strength ECC architecture (a) BCH decoding process, (b) An example of
scalable syndrome generator, (c) Dynamic reconfiguration scheme applied to syndrome
generator using turning-off gate [12].

20

Table 2. Hardware Implementation Results of VC ECC
1Bit Cor.
BCH

2Bit Cor.
BCH

4Bit Cor.
BCH

8bit Cor.
BCH

Reconfi.
BCH

6108

10298

18887

36557

37407

6ns

6ns

6ns

6ns

6ns

# of Cycles

3

4

6

10

3/4/6/10

Parity bits

8

16

32

48

8/16/32/48

Power (mW)

1.62

2.46

3.87

6.21

1.78/2.55/4.13/6.35

BCH Type
Total area
(Gate counts)
Critical path

(a) Variable-strength ECC encoder: BCH encoder is composed of two parts, Galois field
adders and dividers. The division part is designed according to generate polynomial g(x), and
different error correction BCH encoders generally have different generator polynomial g(x). Four
different division parts are used in the reconfigurable encoder (1bit / 2bit / 4bit/ 8bit). The area
overhead of the different division parts is small since the area of BCH encoder is much smaller
(around 5 %) than that of decoder.
(b) Variable-strength ECC decoder: The VC-ECC decoder is basically similar to 8 bit
correction BCH decoder. However, the architectures are designed scalable such that simple control
logics can easily turn off the unused modules when the correction capability is 1 or 2 or 4 or 8 bits.
First, the syndrome generator of the VC-ECC decoder is similar to that of 8bit correction
BCH. As shown in Figure 3.2(b), since the syndrome generator for 1bit, 2bit or 4 bit correction
BCH can be expressed as a subset of syndrome generator for 8 bit correction BCH [13], the
architecture is scalable, which means that only 12.5 %, 25 % or 50 % of syndrome generators can
be utilized with simple control logic to generate the syndromes for 1 bit, 2 bit or 4 bit correction
BCH, respectively. Key equation solver (KES) and Chien search modules can be designed scalable
like Syndrome generator, and the unused module can be simple turned off using the turning-off
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scheme. The turning-off scheme applied to Syndrome generator is illustrated in Figure 3.3(c).
Simple pull-up and pull-down transistors with correct dimensions is being used based on whether
1-bit, 2-bit, 4-bit or 8-bit correction scheme is being exercised. The pull-down NMOS transistor is
required to ensure that the syndrome generator modules provide ‘zero’ output when unused for
correct ECC functionality. Details of the power-gate inclusion were obtained from [12].
The proposed variable-strength ECC decoder is implemented using 65-nm standard-cell
CMOS library, and Table 2 shows the implementation results. Separate 1-bit (Hamming), 2-bit, 4bit and 8-bit correction BCH decoders are also implemented for comparison. The power
consumptions of various BCH decoders are measured at 100MHz, 1.2V with spice-level
simulations using 1000 input data. As the error correction capability increases, the area
requirement is understandably larger. The additional area for turning-off gates and control logic
are accounted for in the results presented in Table 2. The area overhead of the proposed variable
ECC is not significant compared to 8-bit correction BCH decoder.
(c) Dynamic adaptation scheme: The proposed variable-strength ECC has four choices of
error correction capabilities, and the correction mode can be controlled using 2 bit mode selection
signal as shown in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2(c). This mode selection signal is generated from
control logic, and the information is updated at runtime on a regular basis by monitoring the
magnetic attack strength at temper detection sensor. When the strength of attack becomes larger,
the dynamic adaptation scheme can change mode selection signal to offer stronger error correction
capabilities. For protection of on-chip cache memory, the 2-bit mode selection is stored per cache
block to indicate the encoding type, and the number of ways to store ECC bits is dynamically
adjusted during runtime [14]. The two bit overhead for the mode selection storage is negligible (<
0.3% area overhead) considering a typical cache block size (e.g. 512bits). If we cannot correct a
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block due to inadequate correction capability, then we can set its dirty bit and fetch it from the next
level. If we're using the memory as last level of memory, then even higher protection is needed. In
the proposed ECC, another way of checking the occurrence of STTRAM failures by ECC itself is
to monitor the outputs of syndrome generator since any non-zero syndrome indicates memory
failure occurrence. This syndrome monitoring scheme can be used to check the frequency of
STTRAM failures in the functional mode.
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS4
Table 3 shows BER results when variable-strength ECC is applied to STTRAM cells which
are under attack with various strength of magnetic fields. Input vector with 108 bit is used for the
BER simulations. In the table, magnetic attack strength of 76.9Oe 100μA means that 76.9Oe is
combined with 100μA current to model active operation mode. According to the results, when the
magnetic attack strength of 76.8Oe 100μA is used, STTRAM cells show raw BER of 3*10-3. In
this case, ECC with 4 bit corrections (t=4) can be selected to correct STTRAM bit failures. When
the attack strength is as large as 76.9Oe 500μA, the STTRAM raw BER is too large (9.7*10-1) that
the failures cannot be corrected even with 8 bit correctable ECC. However, the proposed adaptive
ECC scheme using BCH codes can detect any number of failures by checking the output of the
syndrome generator (i.e. all zero means no failure). If we detect bit failures which are too many to
correct by the current ECC, then we can invalidate the corresponding cache blocks, thus preventing
use of wrong data.
The information in Table 3 can be used for array sleep when the magnetic attack strength
can be proactively determined. For example, when the predicted attack strength is around 76.7Oe
100μA, the ECC correction capability (t) of the proposed variable-strength ECC can be decided as
t=2. Then, the memory data is read out, re-encoded to match the correction capability of ECC to
the level of external field and written back to memory before it goes to array sleep.

4

Portions of this chapter were previously published in [16]. Permission is included in Appendix A.
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Table 3. Bit Error Rates (BERs) VC ECC is Applied to STTRAM Cells Attacked with Various
Strengths of Magnetic Fields.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS5
We demonstrated the possibility of a contactless tampering using common magnet or
electromagnet on STTRAM for the first time. Our analysis indicated that an adversary can achieve
significant success in destroying the data by creating a strong external magnetic field, which can
be accomplished even with low-cost publicly accessible magnets. We quantified the impact of
such attack using a widely used micro-magnetic simulation framework from NIST. Next, we have
presented a novel sensor based on memory replica that can detect memory corruption due to such
an attack ahead of time along with the intensity and polarity of a magnetic field attack. Finally, we
have presented two low-overhead effective design solutions to mitigate the attack, namely, (1)
array sleep; and (2) variable strength Error Correction Code (ECC) that can dynamically adapt its
correction capability. Both protection approaches rely on the sensor’s output – e.g., the variable
ECC dynamically adapts error protection based on sensed intensity of the filed. These solutions
together can provide high level of protection against such attacks. They solutions can also be
effective to counter effect of naturally-present (non-malicious) magnetic field induced failures in
specific applications (e.g. geo-thermal exploration). Future work will include further optimization
of sensor design, analysis of other forms of contactless tampering attacks (e.g. with an
electromagnetic field), and investigation of similar attacks in other forms of memory (e.g. resistive
or phase change memory).

5

Portions of this chapter were previously published in [16]. Permission is included in Appendix A.
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